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Abstract. Strong passwords have been preached since decades. How-
ever, lot of the regular users of IT systems resort to simple and repeti-
tive passwords, especially nowadays in the “service era”. To help alleviate
this problem, a new class of software grew popular: password managers.
Since their introduction, password managers have slowly been migrating
into the cloud. In this paper we review and analyze current professional
password managers in the cloud. We discuss several functional and non-
functional requirements to evaluate existing solutions and we sum up
their strengths and weaknesses. The main conclusion is that a silver bul-
let solution is not available yet and that this type of tools still deserve a
significant research effort from the privacy and security community.
1 Introduction
For many years, IT professionals have preached the importance of strong pass-
words. Many publications exist, describing exactly what defines a strong pass-
word and user habits [1]. The general consensus is that it needs at least both
upper- and lower-case letters, digits and preferably also symbols (#, , etc.).
Additionally, it should not be a word, or a word where an L is replaced by a 1.
And of course it has to be at least 8 characters long. More importantly, the user
is not supposed to use the same password for more than one service. With all of
these rules for strong passwords, it comes as no surprise that many low-security-
educated users of IT services resort to simple and repetitive passwords.
To help alleviate this problem, a new class of software grew popular: Pass-
word managers. Those are simple tools, usually protected by a single master
password, able to generate and store in a secure manner, distinct and hardly-to-
guess passwords in place of the user herself. A lot of the IT professionals took
these tools to their heart, despite their inherent —very often hidden— flaws.
As with many other contexts in modern society, the users crave convenience.
In particular, tools storing an encrypted file with all the password locally, was
no longer sufficient, as the majority of users began to use multiple devices and
needed to have passwords available in all of them. Hence, the password man-
agers slowly migrated into the cloud. This also saved the users from the hassle
of managing their passwords, themselves: the users unload some of the “respon-
sibilities” onto third parties and their data are kept for them, available at all
times, from any device.
While the cloud does come with its benefits, especially convenience, it has its
own drawbacks as well, primarily trust. When uploading data into the cloud, the
user is effectively trusting the service provider. She is trusting that the provider
is completely honest about the inner working of its service, mainly regarding
what it can and can not access. Users are trusting the providers when they say
that they do not share their information to third parties. Unfortunately, some-
times this trust is betrayed, mainly when service providers experience technical
incidents. In the context of cloud password managers, for example, it is well
known the involving LastPass company in 20153. As many IT professionals had
feared, the online password manager had a breach. Panic arose and LastPass
almost forced their users to change their passwords.
However, even if trust is a general issue with the cloud, in the case of pass-
word managers it is particularly critical, as the user trusts a service to store
confidential information that give access to, potentially, all the other services
the user everyday accesses. Thus, it is ultimately important to have a detailed
knowledge and a objective security assessment of the password manager services
available in the cloud.
Contribution and Outline of the Paper. The main contribution of this paper is a
comparative and critical security analysis of the different alternatives available
for the user, with the final aim to understand if a suitable manager already exists
or if (as it is) further efforts are required to provide adequate protection to users’
passwords. In particular, in this paper
– we consider and discuss functional and non-functional requirements for pass-
word manager services in the cloud;
– we survey and perform a usability and security assessment of 14 typologies
of professional password manager tools available in the cloud;
– we compare the results of the assessment and focus on the main weaknesses
We think that the final outcome of our analysis will raise the awareness of the
less-security-aware users and will call the IT community for a higher effort to
face the password management in the cloud. We want to stress that the paper is
focused on available professional password manager tools, while purely academic
approaches are left as future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: next section contains the analysis
of the functional and non-functional requirements a password manager service
in the cloud should guarantee. Section 3 is focused on the description of the
password manager services considered for this paper, while Section 4 contains
the comparison of the obtained results. Section 5 concludes the paper with some
final future directions.
2 Functional and Non-Functional Requirements
In this section we report and briefly describe the most desirable requirements a
cloud password manager service should have. We distinguish between functional
3 http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/06/password-manager-lastpass-warns-of-breach/
and non-functional requirements [20]. The former define the expected functioning
of the system, namely what the system is expected to do, while the latter refer
to qualities of the system, including performance, usability, reliability and so
on. In the next subsection we identified 17 functional requirements, as desirable
features of the system.
2.1 Functional requirements
The first mandatory functionality a cloud password manager solution should
have is the accessibility: namely, it should be possible to have access to the pass-
words from several physical devices. We say that it has to have a distributed pass-
word database. Another desired functionality is that it should support multiple
—individual— users. It should also be possible to distinguish between adminis-
trators and regular users. In order to better restrict outside access, the admin
will have to create a new user. This can be done either with the admin actually
setting up the user, or an invite to registration.
It should be possible to organize passwords in a structured way and in multi-
ple levels, customizable by the individual users, for the best user experience. For
convenience, it should also be possible to selectively share passwords, according
to the user needs.
The desirable solution should be platform agnostic, and should not be limited
to one specific server software. In particular, the user should be able to choose
what type of underlying storage/database, he or she prefers to use. This would
also make possible to run it on low powered devices.
No password —or any other sensitive data— should ever be present unen-
crypted anywhere else, than a local device. This ensures that even if another part
of the solution is somehow compromised, data is not revealed on that device.
The users should be able to audit access to their personal data including, but
not limited to, retrieving passwords, adding/changing passwords, and deleting
passwords. This should be done leveraging a logging system, able at least to
record detailed access time and the remote host. This ensures that a user can
detect if, when and from where unauthorized accesses have occurred.
Access to the system should be protected by the users master password, and
it should be possible to change it. Enabling and using a two-factor authentication
mechanism should be a possible option. Finally, to protect the availability of the
system, we would require that the client-side of the system should automatically
restart after a hardware reboot.
2.2 Non-Functional Requirements
Considering non-functional requirements, we selected 7 desirable properties of
password manager services. Firstly, we would require that there is the option
to store the passwords where the user has control over. This would make the
system more flexible, since it would open the way for a password manager in a
private cloud.
1. In-Browser built-in 6. Zoho Vault 11. SimpleVault
2. LastPass (and similar) 7. TeamPasswordManager 12. RoboForm
3. KeePass (and similar) 8. Passwordstate 13. Vaultier
4. Rattic 9. Simple Safe 14. TeamPass
5. Encryptr 10. PassWork
Table 1: Password managers considered in the analysis
In order to promote further development, allowing for use of various open
source frameworks and libraries, the solution should be open source and licensed
with an appropriate license (MIT for instance). The solution should be scalable,
namely able to store at least million of password entries, spread across all users.
The encryption used for storing the passwords should be of industry standard,
and should be viable for at least 5 years. The same goes for the encryption used
for communication. For maximum security, the solution should only accept and
use TLS version 1.2 connections, with a limited cipher suite.
Finally, for the best user experience, all the interaction with the user interface
should be realized with a latency never exceeding 500ms. Any longer, and the
user will grow tired of using the software, because of its sluggish feel.
3 Tools
In this section we briefly introduce 14 different available password manager tools,
detailing the most relevant features and postponing in Section 4 a more thorough
analysis. We considered only real systems already usable to final users, as listed
in Table 1. In the last part of this section, we also report a concise survey of
proposals coming from the literature and not available as usable tools.
In the following sections we briefly describe each of the considered solutions,
with also a critical eye towards the user experience and the usability: if the
solution is not user friendly, the users will not use it and then it is effectively
worthless.
1. In-Browser password managers. The most used password managers are
probably the ones built-in into the various browsers. This is a feature most ma-
jor browsers have adopted: Chrome, FireFox, Edge (new name of Internet Ex-
plorer), Safari and Opera. Almost all of the most recent versions of the mentioned
browsers can sync their passwords between different devices, but this requires
to upload the passwords to one of the corporations’ Web sites. Additionally,
built-in password managers have one big limitation: they only work within web
sites accessed through that specific type of browser, i.e. only in Chrome browser.
Passwords for other applications (like email clients, development suites and so
on) cannot be easily retrieved.
In [27] it is presented an analysis of the storage formats for the different
browsers’ password managers. While their results are for probably outdated ver-
sions (for example the analyzed version of Chrome was v.21.0, while at the time
of writing, the current newest version is v.47.0), their primary concern is the en-
cryption methods used by the web browsers to store the passwords. At the time
of their analysis, only Firefox and Opera were supporting a master password to
enable the access to the stored passwords.
2. LastPass, and similar solutions. LastPass4, PassPack5, DashLane6, and
many others are smartphone apps coupled with plug-in browser enabling the
user to access the passwords from several devices. We refer only to LastPass as
a representative of this group, it being the most well-known.
LastPass uses 256-bit AES encryption for the communications and applies
PBKDF2, as the hashing function, in order to make it difficult to crack stored
data. Both encryption and decryption are performed client side [10], as to avoid
transferring the actual password, unencrypted, to their servers. Encryption and
decryption are done using the master password, which is never actually sent to
their servers. Finally, as is to be expected, all connections to LastPass’ servers,
are TSL 1.2 encrypted.
Regarding the usability, LastPass allows the user to organize passwords in
folders, creating the tree-like structure. For devices without a browser support-
ing plug-ins, LastPass offers a so-called bookmarklet [9]. A bookmarklet is a
bookmark, which essentially contains JavaScript code, in order to add previ-
ously unobtainable features, in a browser. While this on the surface seems like a
nifty feature, work in [12] discusses an attack on LastPass, exploiting the users
bookmarklet, to gain access to virtually all of the users stored credentials. Fi-
nally, it is work mentioning that there has been a recent leak from LastPass [25],
that leads to even more users to look suspicious of their services.
3. KeePass, and similar solutions. KeePass7 gained fame after the LastPass
data breach. Differently to this latter, KeePass allows the user to store the
passwords in a local file. While there exists a plethora of tools similar to KeePass,
it will be used as a representative of this group.
Version 2.x of KeePass uses AES-256 encryption, but it can also apply addi-
tional algorithms through plug-ins [8]. This enables users to tailor the encryption
security, to their own requirements. KeePass features a tree-like structure, in or-
der to completely organize passwords and also has a fully customizable password
generator, where the user can also choose the character sets.
KeePass lacks of usability, since it does not support password distribution.
Since KeePass works on a local file, it would only inherently work on a single de-





file in the cloud. Additionally, there is the lack of cross-platform compatibility,
since KeePass only supports Windows.
4. Rattic. Rattic [7] is a self-hosted password manager, in the so-called private
cloud. Rattic can be considered a password management database, with a special
focus on managing passwords for a team [7]. Since Rattic is meant for teams
it has multi-user support and makes the distinction between admin and regular
users. It organizes passwords and users in groups, for easy access control, where
a group is a collection of users which can access the same passwords. Addition-
ally it supports tags for their passwords, allowing for even further organization,
for their users allowing quick access to similar passwords, from across different
groups. However, the fact that Rattic is team-oriented, the user cannot simply
create “private” passwords, but it needs to manually create a group with a single
user. Rattic also provides a password generator and makes possible to download
passwords in the KeePass format, making it available for later oﬄine use.
Regarding the technical aspects, Rattic surprisingly does not encrypt pass-
words stored in the database and highly recommends storing the database on
an encrypted drive, to ensure database protection. Clearly, this does mean that
a system administrator can access all passwords, should he or she have the en-
cryption key for the drive. As a positive note, Rattic is developed in Python,
using the Django framework and tested on the Apache server.
5. Encryptr. Bordering between the type of LastPass and Rattic, Encryptr [3]
relies on the Crypton [6] backend [4]. Crypton is an application framework and
backend service to develop applications, providing the required primitives for
cryptography. Encryptr can host the passwords on a third party cloud service
(namely SpiderOak8), but makes also possible to run a dedicated Crypton back-
end, like a the private cloud. However, this requires a high level of technical
skills, including editing source files [5], apply patches, compile and fine setting.
This severely affects the usability of the solution. Moreover, the user interface is
very minimalist and sleek, while passwords are stored in one unique, single list.
Despite its complexity, the Crypton backend stands for its zero-knowledge
security [19]: according to the authors, it is impossible to obtain the unencrypted
data on their servers, without actually getting hold of the users’ private encryp-
tion keys. The Crypton backend is open source and uses AES-256.
6. Zoho Vault. Zoho Vault [15] relies on the storage within proprietary cloud
and aims at enterprise customers, providing interesting features, such as LDAP
integration. Vault organizes passwords in so called “chambers” and each pass-
word can be added to one or more chambers. While this approach sounds a valid
alternative to the classic tree-style organization, it does not add any real benefit
to the final user. Zoho Vault uses a combination of RSA and AES. To enable
sharing, a common AES encryption key is retrieved using RSA keypairs [16].
8 http://spideroak.com
7. Team Password Manager. Team Password Manager [26] is a tool that is
fairly similar to Rattic, being enterprise-oriented and organizing passwords in
a tree-like hierarchy of “projects” and sub-projects. It can be privately-hosted,
and is platform independent, requiring Apache, PHP and MySQL.
Team Password Manager uses AES-256 and bcrypt as its key derivation func-
tion, to slow down brute force attacks against password hashes. It also supports
Google’s Authenticator, for two-factor authentication. Being enterprise-oriented,
it is very complex and can keep away low-security-wise regular users.
8. Passwordstate. Passwordstate from ClickStudios [17] is another enterprise-
oriented solution. It has Active Directory support, and other built-in options, as
High Availability, a fully customizable password generator and several options
for two-factor authentication. Passwordstate is self-hostable, but requires a Win-
dows platform and the IIS server (it is not platform agnostic). Passwordstate has
a very intuitive UI and it is able to give the most important information, the
most screen-space. The tree-like structure that creates an excellent organiza-
tional options for the users. However, its enterprise-oriented engine presents the
user with many technical options, reducing its usability for a regular user.
Passwordstate encrypts all passwords using AES-256 [18] and protects the
backend services (web service and database) employing code obfuscation of the
pages and encryption of the data.
9. Simple Safe. Simple Safe [14] is another self-hosted team password man-
ager solution. The user can choose to organize passwords into “groups”, that
are accessed through a menu, which is auto hidden. Unfortunately, changing
between groups takes a long time, in the order of seconds. This causes a bad
experience for the user: while generally the developers of Simple Safe have been
very generous with the animations, this causes a heavy latency that adds to the
overall sluggish feel of the system. Considering the possibility to organize the
passwords, it is worth citing as the user can customize the fields in the differ-
ent groups. For instance, they allow the user to store SSH keys, in dedicated
field type, making possible to separate passwords that require keys/certs, from
traditional username/password logins.
The technical details about Simple Safe are very few. The only available in-
formation regarding security or encryption is the following quote: “Simple Safe
utilizes a 256 bit encryption method. Each password has a unique private salt
along with a master salt stored separately to the database. Only encrypted pass-
words are stored within the database.’ ’ [13].
10. PassWork. PassWork [21] is yet another enterprise-oriented solution, avail-
able as both a remote and a self-hosted, both of which comes with a price tag. It
organizes passwords in “groups” and sub-groups with an associate list of users
currently allowed to access that passwords. Interestingly, it offers the option of
setting permissions to users, namely when adding a user it is possible to give
different permissions like “Full Access”, “Edit”, “Read” and so on.
Being a closed source solution, PassWork’s developers do not describe and
document their solution adequately. Something as simple as figuring out which
platform it supports, prior to purchasing is not possible. Additionally, they sim-
ply state of using “256-bit passwords” and RSA keypairs for sharing passwords.
11. SimpleVault. SimpleVault [2] encrypts each individual password with a
different “passphrase”. As the name suggests, SimpleVault is much more a proof
of concept, with an extremely minimalist interface: adding a password is done
in a page having two fields completely not described. It provides a powerful
password generator, with increasingly “rare” symbols. Retrieving a password,
requires the user to type in the passphrase. The choice of this per-password
passphrase, will undoubtedly only result in the user using the same password
over and over again. However, this choice does allow for the system to be used
by multiple users, each just using their own master passphrase for all of their
passwords.
The security of SimpleVault is again described with few details. The authors
state that at some point or other, the encrypted data are eventually stored in
clear text on the remote machine. Moreover, they state that when adding a
new entry, the password is sent without encryption to the server, which in turn
encrypts it, only relying on the HTTPS. Additionally, SimpleVault does not use
a database system, but stores all contents in a .txt file.
12. RoboForm. RoboForm [24] is somewhat a hybrid between KeePass and
LastPass: it locally stores the password and is available to the user as a web
browser extension. Additionally, it offers “RoboForm Everywhere” cloud syn-
chronization of the encrypted file. This does however, entail trusting them with
safe-keeping the encrypted file. Using RoboForm on a single device, renders it
as a tool very similar to KeePass, albeit with “better” browser integration.
13. Vaultier. Vaultier [22] is self-hosted, has a imperceptible latency for any
UI actions, and has a clean design of the front page. Passwords are organized
in vaults, where cards are placed and, inside of these cards are the passwords.
However, the UI showing inside a single vault, only shows six cards at a time.
Similarly, at most two passwords can be displayed on screen, at a time. It also
has a password generator, with limited customizable options.
Vaultier is open source, since it has a the git repository’s history publicly
shown. However, it seems like the project is in a idle state, since the last update
was done on the 17th of April, 2015 [23].
14. TeamPass. TeamPass [11] ensures platform agnosticism due to being im-
plemented in PHP, and only requiring an Apache server and MySQL server. It
features a series of APIs to permit an access to TeamPass Items from a third
party application. However, it only relies on HTTPS to transmit the passwords
that are, indeed, sent using the GET HTTP method. Additionally, based on the
description of the APIs, it appears clear as the password is decrypted server-side.
4 Analysis
While the previous section provided a high level description of the considered
solutions, here we detail how each of them deal with the requirements introduced
in Section 2, providing a unified picture. The analysis is shown in Fig. 1.
Functional requirements (F-Req)
1. Distributed password database 10. Permission for new passwords
2. Multi-user support 11. Permission for reading passwords
3. Support admin and regular users 12. Permission for deleting passwords
4. Hierarchical password organization 13. Extensive auditing
5. Password sharing 14. Single master password
6. Admin user management 15. Single master password modification
7. Platform agnostic 16. Support two-factor authentication
8. Database agnostic 17. Auto-start after reboot
9. Encrypted storage
Non-functional requirements (NF-Req)
1. User-controlled storage 5. Strong communication encryption
2. Open Source License 6. Only use TLS 1.2 or higher
3. At least 1 million passwords 7. Latency below 500ms
4. Strong storage encryption
Fig. 1: Analysis of requirements and available professional password manager
In order to better investigate some of the requirements, we provide a closer
look to some of the most desirable functional requirements. Fig. 2 distinguishes
between solutions that are able to be run in the private cloud, and those who
are not. Focusing only on those which actually can be hosted in a private cloud,
Fig. 3 shows their default organization with respect to the passwords. While all of
the systems support multiple users, they all do not consider personal passwords.
Fig. 2: Comparison of access method and ownership model, of the available solutions.
Fig. 3: Comparison of password ownership in self-hostable solutions.
This is primarily a result of nearly all of these being marketed towards enter-
prises and team-oriented development. However, for almost all of the solutions,
it is possible to solve this shortcoming, creating a new personal group for each
individual user, in which personal passwords can be stored. Unfortunately, this
must be considered as a workaround, with the only exception of PassWork, which
creates this group automatically.
Looking at the more technical aspects of the assessment, in Fig. 4 we report
the agnosticism of the compared solutions. Most of the password manager service
are able to run on multiple platforms, being implemented in PHP. Hence, they
only require an Apache (or nginx) Web server to run. Fortunately, both of these
Fig. 4: Comparison of agnosticism of self-hostable solutions.
have versions for all the major operating systems. Considering the database
agnosticism, instead, there is only Rattic that actually offers different options.
However, even in this case, the developers warn that different options are done
at the user’s risk, since all the alternatives have to be considered experimental.
As our analysis shows, no tool covers all of the requirements. Although some
tools might come close, they still lack too much to be considered a viable option.
5 Conclusion
Cloud password managers are becoming increasingly popular, helping users to
protect their services with stronger passwords, relieving them from the extra
effort required. The number of possible professional alternatives is high, as this
paper shows, but also a perfect solution is still missing. We have considered 17
functional requirements and 7 non-functional requirements as the desirable fea-
tures a cloud password manager should possess. Consequently, we have surveyed
14 professional password manager solutions and critically analysed against the
considered requirements. We focused on professional tools only, as we aimed
at getting a clear picture of available implemented cloud password managers.
What emerges is that a silver bullet application is still lacking, as no profes-
sional password manager fully satisfies the set of functional and non-functional
requirements. Consequently, research work has still to be done to propose a so-
lution that is secure, effective and efficient at the same time. Thus, we call the
security community for a higher effort to face the password management in the
cloud, providing adequate protection to users’ passwords.
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